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Applying Utilitarianism and Deontology in 
 Managing Bisphenol-A Risks  
in the United States 
Abigail Martin, Alastair Iles and Christine Rosen 
Abstract: We examine Bisphenol-A (BPA) as a case that illustrates key chal-
lenges in addressing the public health risks of consumer products in the 21st 
century. First, we trace growing concerns about the effects of BPA on human 
health, showing how regulatory approaches can exacerbate the difficulty of 
dealing with the unforeseen risks of chemicals in consumer products. Second, 
we highlight the question of who should bear the responsibility – and the cost 
– of rectifying or preventing unforeseen chemical risks in consumer products. 
Third, we discuss the challenge of substituting out a potentially hazardous 
chemical from consumer products in the context of well-established global 
production chains and consumption patterns. Utilitarian and deontological 
ethical frameworks have influenced societal debates surrounding each of these 
three challenges, creating moral dilemmas for actors with different forms of 
moral agency – both those implicated in the production of harmful chemicals 
and those pursuing remedies. 
Keywords: Bisphenol-A, chemicals regulation, ethics, deontology, utilitarianism. 
1. Introduction 
Bisphenol-A is a chemical used in consumer products such as baby bottles, 
reusable water bottles, and infant formula containers. The substance is found 
in many other products that require strong, clear glassy materials, such as 
electronics and food packaging. Some scientific studies have linked Bi-
sphenol-A (BPA) to diabetes, thyroid disease, various cancers, and obesity, 
but experts disagree over whether BPA is causing harm through its ability to 
disrupt endocrinal functions. Many chemical and product manufacturers have 
defended BPA as safe despite concern about the risks of BPA from activists, 
consumers, and some scientists and researchers. Some companies have volun-
tarily replaced their products with BPA-free versions. Governments appear 
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to be similarly torn: In Europe and Japan, government regulators consider 
BPA safe at current exposure levels, while experts advising the Canadian 
government concluded the opposite.  
 The case of Bisphenol-A exemplifies societal debate over industrial chem-
icals in the 21st century. Over the past fifteen years, public concerns about 
chemicals embodied in consumer products have grown steadily. These chem-
icals can dissipate from products during their use and disposal, and can be 
absorbed or ingested into human bodies. In earlier decades, public concern 
and regulators largely focused on chemical risks created in the manufacturing 
phase, such as factory pollution and hazardous waste. Such risks are still sig-
nificant. However, human exposure to consumer products occurs at a much 
greater order of magnitude: many more people are potentially affected once 
products leave the manufacturing plant.  
 Today there is more attention to the health hazards of toxic chemicals in 
products, but regulators still struggle with the question of how to define 
toxicity. Traditional toxicology studies used by regulators to determine a 
chemical’s toxicity focus on whether a chemical is carcinogenic (cancer-
causing), often overshadowing the question of whether a chemical is estro-
genic, or capable of disrupting hormonal processes in the body. Although 
Bisphenol-A’s estrogenic properties have been known since 1938, its risks are 
still debated – with implications for the numerous chemicals used in consum-
er products that are suspected of being endocrine disruptors.  
 The case of BPA exemplifies three key challenges in the chemical indus-
try. First, tracing the growing concerns about human exposure to BPA shows 
how regulatory approaches can exacerbate the difficulty of dealing with the 
unforeseen risks of chemicals in consumer products. Second, the case raises 
the question of who should bear the responsibility – and the cost – of rectify-
ing or preventing emerging chemical risks in consumer products. Third, BPA 
highlights the challenge of substituting a potentially hazardous chemical for a 
harmful substance in consumer products in the context of well-established 
global production chains and consumption patterns.  
 Utilitarian and deontological ethical frameworks have influenced societal 
debates surrounding each of these three challenges. This article explores how 
these ethical frameworks raise moral dilemmas for the various actors involved 
– both those implicated in the production of harmful chemicals and those 
pursuing remedies: chemists designing molecules; managers devising business 
models for sustainable products; consumers making purchasing decisions; 
governments setting health and safety standards; groups pushing for clearer 
workplaces and products. Each of these actors have moral agency – the power 
to be morally accountable for one’s actions and their consequences. But who 
has moral agency to advance more sustainable outcomes for the public good? 
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When these actors face a moral dilemma, what ethical perspectives determine 
what it means to ‘do the right thing’?  
 In the next few sections, we review the history of BPA use in manufactur-
ing products and track the changing science and perceptions of BPA toxicity 
risks, before turning to discuss the ethical dilemmas of key actors in the BPA 
production chain. While reading this background, you should reflect on what 
responses might be appropriate in a situation in which a chemical risk is not 
yet fully proven but the chemical is commercially lucrative.  
2. A short history of Bisphenol-A 
BPA – also known as 2,2-bis-4-hydroxyphenyl – is a synthetic chemical 
found in numerous products, including automotive parts, water supply pipes, 
electronics, baby bottles, and other food containers. It is one of the highest 
production volume chemicals in the world. By the 1980s, the global produc-
tion of BPA reached almost a million metric tons per year and has grown 
substantially since then (Fiege et al. 2012). According to industry reports, the 
global demand for BPA was over 6 million metric tons in 2013 – representing 
a market size of $US 13.87 billion (Grand View Research 2014). Manufactur-
ing capacity was once concentrated in the US, Europe, and Japan, but has 
expanded to Asia as markets for BPA and consumer end-products made with 
BPA have become increasingly global. 
 BPA gained commercial success in the polymer and plastics production 
with two main end markets: approximately 63% of BPA is used to build pol-
ycarbonate plastic resins and 27% goes into formulating epoxy resin mono-
mers. For both polycarbonates and epoxy resins, BPA is an important 
building block with attributes that industry has found difficult to match with 
substitute chemicals (Ritter 2011). In the US, just five companies manufac-
ture BPA: Bayer, Dow, Hexion Specialty Chemicals, SABIC Innovative Plas-
tics (formerly GE Plastics), and Sunoco collectively generate approximately 
$US 6 billion in sales per year (Case 2009). 
 BPA was first synthesized in 1891, but its commercial production did not 
begin until the early 1950s, after chemists created the first epoxy resins using 
BPA in the US and Europe (Vogel 2009). Epoxy resins are produced by 
transforming liquid polyethers into infusible solids through a special curing 
process that reacts epichlorohydrin with BPA. These resins are versatile 
chemicals that can be formulated to have a range of mechanical properties 
(from extreme flexibility to high strength and harness), chemical resistance, 
high adhesive properties, and high electrical resistance. Epoxy resins became 
82 Abigail Martin, Alastair Iles & Christine Rosen 
 
extensively used throughout the manufacturing sector as protective coatings 
for metal equipment, piping, steel drums, and the interior of food cans. 
 In 1957, chemists at Bayer and General Electric began developing another 
use for BPA as a monomer feedstock in plastics production (Vogel 2013). 
When polymerized with either carbonyl chloride or diphenyl carbonate, BPA 
forms a plastic called polycarbonate. Polycarbonate is hard, clear and nearly 
unbreakable. It is often used to replace glass in a variety of consumer prod-
ucts. The most common trade name for polycarbonate is Lexan.  
3. Diverging Opinions on Whether BPA is ‘Safe’ 
BPA is not only ubiquitous in everyday materials but is also prevalent in 
human bodies. Biomonitoring studies of the American population, for exam-
ple, have consistently shown the widespread presence of BPA in urine, with 
slightly elevated levels in children, females, and lower-income populations 
(Calafat et al. 2008, Vandenberg et al. 2007). In its Fourth National Report 
on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals, the US Centers for Dis-
ease Control found detectable levels of BPA in 93 percent of urine samples 
from over 2,500 people, suggesting almost universal and continual exposure 
(Centers for Disease Control 2009). 
 Although the amount of BPA found in human bodies is usually relatively 
low, experts strongly disagree about the levels at which exposure to BPA is 
harmful. Early toxicology studies in the 1970s found no observable carcino-
genic effects in rodents given high doses of BPA for two years, in part be-
cause BPA metabolized rapidly in the animals’ bodies. Yet, in the last two 
decades, new scientific research has ignited regulatory controversies over 
BPA. A growing number of studies suggest that repeated small doses of BPA 
can disrupt the human endocrine system, especially during prenatal and post-
natal development. Fetuses and infants thus have a heightened risk of devel-
opmental harm when exposed to BPA transmitted through the placenta or in 
breast milk, or through containers like baby bottles.  
 Although environmental and public health advocacy organizations have 
called on governments worldwide to ban the use of BPA in food packaging, 
regulators diverge over whether there is enough evidence to justify controls. 
The challenge is how to decide what this level is, in a situation where scientif-
ically credible studies can substantiate a cause-and-effect relationship be-
tween BPA and adverse health outcomes whereas other scientifically credible 
studies undermine this relationship. Facing apparently conflicting scientific 
evidence, regulators can reach different conclusions about whether BPA is 
safe, because of their differing interpretations of the data and because of their 
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assumptions about which risks and harms matter. For example, within Eu-
rope, there is a splintering of views underway. The European Food Safety 
Authority believes that BPA is safe for use in food packages, while France 
has banned this particular application from January 2015 (Jacobsen 2015). 
 In the US context, a federal system of government exists, in which feder-
al, state, and local levels of government have their own jurisdictions (or areas 
over which they can wield legislative and executive powers). Most chemical 
regulation occurs at the federal level but states and cities can pass their own 
laws or bans, as long as the federal government has not displaced these with 
its own. Three federal regulatory agencies are typically involved in overseeing 
chemical risks: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for food; the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) for toxic substances and pesticides; 
and the Consumer Safety Protection Commission (CSPC) which has ac-
quired some jurisdiction over phthalates in toys and cosmetics. Each agency 
must implement federal laws that gives it specific powers, often founded on 
doing risk assessments to decide whether a chemical must be regulated. In 
other words, chemical risk regulation is divided between these agencies, lead-
ing to many gaps in oversight. 
 In 1963, FDA approved BPA as “generally regarded as safe” for use in 
food additives (Turker 2012). Polycarbonate plastics and epoxy resins are 
regarded as food additives if they come into contact with food. This approval 
means that regulators have neglected BPA for many years, assuming that it 
remains safe. It is up to NGOs and citizens to petition FDA to retract its 
approval. As new evidence has emerged, some state governments have taken 
precautionary action despite the federal government’s hesitancy to regulate 
BPA more stringently. Starting in 2009, Minnesota, California, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Illinois, and other states introduced BPA bans (Barraza 2013). These 
laws primarily targeted baby bottles and sippy cups and, in some cases, child 
food containers more generally. Within the federal government, there have 
been conflicting evaluations. In 2009, Senator Charles Schumer and several 
other politicians in Congress tried to enact the BPA-Free Kids Act of 2009, 
which would have eliminated BPA from all child food containers, including 
cups, bowls, and drinking straws (Barraza 2013). By contrast, the FDA re-
peatedly re-affirmed between 2008 and 2012 that BPA was safe. 
 Understanding why the regulatory and policy debate over BPA is so po-
larized requires looking into how the chemical regulatory process works to 
evaluate toxicity risks. We need to briefly review how risk assessment has 
traditionally worked, and how this analysis struggles to accommodate health 
effects that depart from a standard model of chemical risk. We use the Unit-
ed States as our example, but most industrial countries and some emerging 
economies have had similar regulatory systems in place.  
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3.1 Characterizing BPA risks in the United States 
In the US, regulators working at FDA, EPA, or CSPC typically assess a 
chemical’s risk in four steps (see Figure 1). Their risk assessments studies are 
information-intensive and time consuming. They depend greatly on the avail-
ability of relevant scientific studies and the protocols that regulatory institu-
tions use to draw conclusions from these studies about what is ‘safe’ or 
‘hazardous’.  
 
Figure 1. The Four Step Risk Assessment Process.  
Hazard identification involves reviewing data from toxicology and epidemi-
ological studies to ascertain what adverse health effects may result from hu-
man exposure to the chemical. Toxicology studies use tests of animals in the 
laboratory to determine whether exposure can cause higher levels of a partic-
ular health endpoint – like cancer or infertility – and then extrapolate from 
these tests what the risk would turn out to be for humans. Such extrapola-
tions, of course, are inherently uncertain because rodents and humans are not 
perfectly biologically comparable. Epidemiological studies search for disease 
patterns in human populations, often comparing between two or more 
groups of people in different geographical locations to uncover environmen-
tal contributions to human diseases. Although epidemiological studies can 
provide suggestive evidence, they cannot provide ‘absolute proof’ that expo-
sure to a chemical causes a health endpoint.  
 Especially in the US, researchers have focused on whether BPA causes 
mortality from cancer. This emphasis is built into the entire risk assessment 
framework, because legislators, regulators, and scientists have prioritized 
cancer over all other potential health effects during the past 50 years.1 Be-
cause of this historical legacy, the methodologies and assumptions that have 
accreted around testing for cancer are not designed to readily detect other 
types of health effects, or to accept that dose-effect relationships may vary 
enormously between different types of disease mechanisms. Even cancer – 
once viewed as a single disease – is now understood to be a fiendishly com-
plex set of diseases with diverse physiological and genetic pathways. 
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 The traditional testing methods used on animals in toxicology studies 
measure carcinogenic effects over multiple, sequential stages. Beginning with 
a biological assay, scientists determine whether a chemical in question causes 
mutagenic effects on bacteria. If mutations are observed, additional studies 
are carried out on laboratory rats or mice to identify the ‘maximum tolerated 
dose’ (MTD), which is the lowest lethal dose that kills the lab animals. A new 
group of test animals ingest (or are injected with) the chemical at a dose 
slightly less than the MTD. After two years (or once the animals have died), 
scientists count the number of tumors that accumulated in the animals’ or-
gans and compare the results to a control group.2  
 In recent years, new science has shown that certain chemicals can disrupt 
the endocrine system – the cells, glands, and tissues that secrete hormones 
into the bloodstream. Hormones perform numerous essential functions in 
the human body, and interfering with these can lead to a variety of health 
effects including breast and prostate cancer, cardiovascular disease, early 
puberty, obesity, diabetes, erectile dysfunction, and learning and attention-
related disorders (Evanthia et al. 2009). More generally, humans can suffer 
from lower fertility rates. Such health effects are not part of the traditional 
toxicology testing regime, in part because it is much harder to screen for 
them in the laboratory. Within the laboratory, it can be challenging to ob-
serve whether a chemical has disrupted an individual’s ‘normal’ hormonal 
patterns (Olea et al. 2002, p. 49). Studies are required to observe how actual 
human bodies react to chemicals in the environment. Even so, BPA has been 
a known endocrine disruptor since 1938 (Vandenberg et al. 2007).  
 Dose-response assessment is the second step in traditional toxicity 
screening. The goal is to connect different exposure levels (dose) with the 
likelihood that adverse health effects will occur (response). Regulators have 
generally used experimental animal testing results to generate a ‘monotonic’ 
dose-response curve that demonstrates one of two key indicators. Either the 
‘No Observed Adverse Effect Level’ (NOAEL) or the ‘Lowest Observed 
Adverse Effect Level’ (LOAEL) is calculated. This calculation allows regula-
tors such as FDA to extrapolate the results to human populations and thus 
classify a chemical as carcinogenic or not. A dose is considered safe for hu-
mans if it falls below the point of NOAEL or LOAEL. Doses that fall higher 
on the monotonic curve are more toxic. Based on this level, regulators can 
calculate the reference dose: an estimate of the daily oral exposure level for 
the human population that is unlikely to result in an adverse health effect 
over a lifetime.  
 In the 1980s, EPA and FDA decided that BPA was non-carcinogenic, 
using this dose-response framework. They based this decision on an early 
study in 1977 that found no convincing evidence of carcinogenicity. The 
study was conducted by a private laboratory, contracted by the National 
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Cancer Institute to study BPA for carcinogenic effects (Vogel 2009). After 
two years of administering high doses of BPA to male adult rodents, re-
searchers found BPA’s general toxicity to be low because BPA metabolized 
rapidly in the animals. Regulators and scientists therefore assumed that BPA 
must be safe and did not inquire further into its safety for many years. 
 Yet, the National Cancer Institute and other early toxicology studies of 
BPA did not test estrogenic compounds. They failed to study female animals, 
and they did not think about the possibility that humans might be exposed 
continually to these chemicals. Quick metabolism may not mean ‘no risk’ if it 
is occurring repeatedly. This lack of scrutiny began to change as endocrinol-
ogy science matured. Endocrinologists studying in utero exposure to synthet-
ic estrogens exposed pregnant mice to low doses of BPA – much lower than 
in animal studies used in the 1977 NCI regulatory study – and surprisingly 
observed adverse health effects (Vogel 2009). For instance, a 1990 study 
showed that male mice embryo exposed to low doses of BPA are more likely 
to have an enlarged prostates as adults, compared to mice not exposed to 
BPA (vom Saal et al. 1990).  
 Studying the effects of chemicals crossing the placenta during pregnancy 
created a new toxicological paradigm that challenged the traditional assump-
tion of ‘the higher the dose, the greater the harm’. The dose-response rela-
tionship for endocrine disruptors actually follows a U-shape curve, in which 
low doses and extremely high doses produce the greatest harm (Welshons et 
al. 2003). Scientists call this curve a ‘non-monotonic response’. Thus, for 
endocrine disruptors like BPA, the traditional dose-response assessment fails 
to accurately assess risk.  
 Exposure assessment, the third step, involves estimating the actual levels 
at which humans are exposed to a chemical. For BPA, exposure assessment 
has tended to focus on food consumption patterns, the occurrence of BPA in 
foods, and non-dietary sources of BPA exposure. Given the range of con-
sumer products made with polycarbonates and epoxy resins, humans are 
typically exposed to many sources. Food is considered the greatest source of 
BPA exposure for most population groups because of food packaging.  
 Studies indicate, for instance, that BPA can migrate from polycarbonate 
packaging into food and beverages. This is because polymerization reactions 
always leave some monomer unreacted. The unreacted portion of BPA stays 
solid at room temperature, but over time and under higher temperatures, it 
can leach out (UK Food Standards Agency 2001). Most government expo-
sure assessments have found that BPA migration from polycarbonate into 
food is very low under typical room temperature conditions, around 5 mi-
crograms per kilogram (µg/kg) or less of body weight per day (Biles et al. 
1997, Mountfort et al. 1997). However, certain populations experience great-
er exposure, namely infants at 0-6 months age who are fed from polycar-
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bonate bottles that are often heated above room temperature to warm liquid 
baby formula. For bottle-fed infants, BPA exposures are much higher than 
for infants fed using non-polycarbonate bottles. BPA can also potentially 
migrate from epoxy resin can coatings into food and beverages.  
 Nonetheless, food packaging is not the only major source of BPA: ther-
mal paper, plastics, and electronics could also be other sources, and they are 
only beginning to be included in exposure studies. People can be exposed to 
many synergistically interacting sources, thus creating a cumulative low dose 
that can cross a critical threshold. Regulators, industry, scientists, and envi-
ronmental NGOs disagree on whether and how to include this dimension. 
 Finally, risk characterization determines what exposure level is ‘safe’ for 
the public. In the face of this new research, regulators have struggled to de-
termine what scientific research should be used to define BPA safety. Be-
tween 1997 and 2005, at least 115 studies were conducted by public and 
private research laboratories in the US, Japan, and Europe, which report a 
range of adverse effects from various BPA exposure levels (Vogel 2009, p. 
S562). Many government-funded studies conclude BPA could affect human 
development, even in small amounts. Industry-funded studies cast doubt on 
these findings, questioning whether studies that test for estrogenic activity 
are methodologically sound (raising complaints of lack of reproducibility, 
poor design, potential confounders unaccounted for, inappropriate manipula-
tion of data, flawed statistical analysis, and so on). These claims hinge on the 
assumption that traditional toxicology science is the only legitimate way for 
assessing risk.  
 To provide apparent clarity on the state of BPA science, the Harvard 
Center for Risk Assessment published, in 2006, a review study of all pub-
lished studies on BPA, and concluded that only two studies – both of which 
were funded by industry – provided ‘reliable’ data, in large part because many 
studies diverged from the traditional monotonic dose-response assessment 
paradigm. However, the Harvard Center has a history of favoring industry 
perspectives on risk. By contrast, in 2007, the National Institute of Environ-
mental Health Sciences released findings from two government-sponsored 
review studies of the same scientific literature. A special expert panel told the 
institute that BPA concentrations in the human body are associated with 
“changes in the prostate, breasts, testis, mammary glands, body size, brain 
structure and chemistry, and behavior of laboratory animals” (vom Saal et al. 
2007, p. 134). Thus, the conflicting interpretations of the science continued 
to play out in regulatory circles.  
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4. Who is responsible for acting on BPA Risk? 
In the US context, there have been ongoing debates about who should take 
responsibility for reducing any BPA risks. Should it be government with its 
regulatory authority and public protection role? Or should it be industry 
with its practical capacity to change products and its interest in profit? 
Should intervention be left to consumers to decide through the market 
whether they want to bear what might be a speculative risk? In the 1970s, the 
answer would have been clear: the federal government had a political stake in 
defending its population from environmental degradation, and was expanding 
its regulatory apparatus to enable strong precautionary action. But by the 
1980s, when the Reagan Administration’s deregulatory agenda was in full 
flow, the answer would have been: let industry and the market choose. In the 
2000s, regulation was more welcome politically, but some government agen-
cies still favored industry interests after decades of lobbying and Congress 
pressures. 
 FDA’s story illustrates the entrenched institutional cultures and con-
straints that shape US chemical regulation. Historically, FDA was meant to 
protect Americans from adulterated and contaminated foods (as well as as-
suring pharmaceutical safety). But FDA became caught between its depend-
ence on traditional risk assessment methods and its closeness to industry. 
FDA retained considerable discretion to interpret scientific research to sup-
port its regulatory cases. Nonetheless, in the 2000s and 2010s, fissures have 
opened up inside FDA, resulting in confused positions that reveal much 
about its organizational thought processes. 
 Given the inertia of a regulatory system founded on traditional toxicology 
principles, it was little surprise that in 2008, FDA agreed with the Harvard 
Center’s conclusion that BPA was safe at current exposure levels. While 
some retailers voluntarily removed products containing BPA from their 
shelves, FDA cited the lack of validity of low-dose studies that rely on ques-
tionable scientific methodologies that may not be reliable enough for regula-
tory toxicity testing. This finding undercuts attempts by federal legislators to 
intervene more vigorously. The Consumer Product Safety Modernization 
Act had just passed in Congress. Inspired by state-level and European Union 
bans on phthalates, this law empowered the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission to ban, for use in children’s soft toys, a handful of phthalates 
that were suspected of being significant endocrine disrupters. This law would 
have included a similar ban on BPA in children’s food containers. 
 From 2009 onwards, FDA began to revise its position on BPA. It is not a 
coincidence that the Obama Administration entered power in 2009. Like 
other government agencies, political appointees oversee FDA, altering with 
each Administration. Thus, politically contentious regulatory decisions may 
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change according to the values of each Administration. The agency requested 
that an independent science advisory board review BPA findings (yet again) 
and make recommendations. By 2010, FDA officially began expressing con-
cerns about BPA safety. In 2012, FDA rebuffed a petition from the Natural 
Resources Defense Council to ban BPA in food packaging and containers as 
no longer ‘generally accepted as safe’. Oddly enough, the agency announced 
that baby bottles and children’s drinking cups should no longer contain BPA. 
FDA explained that this voluntary call was not based on scientific evidence 
but on a request by the American Chemistry Council (the chemical indus-
try’s main trade association) to implement the ban in order to boost consum-
er confidence in the midst of regulatory confusion (Tavernise 2012). 
 The controversies over BPA research continue on. A 2012 review of more 
than 800 studies on BPA found that even extremely small doses of BPA can 
be toxic and that low doses of BPA are linked to higher rates of obesity, dia-
betes, thyroid disease, breast cancer, prostate cancer, and other illnesses 
(Vandenberg et al. 2012). The study authors conclude that “fundamental 
changes in chemical testing and safety determination are needed to protect 
human health” (ibid.). Yet, in February 2014, FDA scientists concluded that 
low-level exposure to BPA is safe, and that low-dose studies did not show 
adverse effects (Delclos et al. 2014). However, some scientists not affiliated 
with the FDA study criticize the FDA’s study design for not investigating all 
relevant health endpoints like changes in brain behavior (Bienkowski 2014). 
Researchers from another government study organized by the National Insti-
tutes of Health charge that FDA did not use the most up-to-date quality 
control methods in use among university researchers, nor did it incorporate 
new scientific findings about how chemicals affect human bodies through 
endocrine disruption (Blake 2014). 
 Academic researchers and advocacy groups criticize the FDA of being too 
accommodating to the scientific standards of industry scientists, whose real 
aim is to institute a standard of proof for risk that is unattainable – a tactic 
that the tobacco industry used to fight regulation. Proponents of BPA’s safe-
ty respond that academic scientists relying on large government grants have a 
vested interest in keeping BPA on the publicly-funded research agenda, and 
that their research is overly influenced by personal goals of doing ‘advocacy 
research’ that supports activists’ claims (Miller 2014). In these highly adver-
sarial circumstances, scientific evidence will remain contested, and it seems 
unlikely that a decisive ban on BPA is forthcoming unless government 
strongly favors a precautionary stance. 
 In the absence of federal regulation, and with a patchwork of a few states 
restricting BPA through bans or labeling laws, what can be done? Some com-
panies have attempted to address consumers’ concerns about BPA through 
product innovation.  
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5. Substituting BPA for Alternatives in Well-
Established Production Chains 
In response to consumer concerns, NGO campaigns, and imminent regula-
tion in the late 2000s, manufacturers quickly introduced new product lines, 
marketing them as containing BPA-free materials. As scientific evidence 
pointed to BPA’s endocrine-disrupting effects, consumer safety, environ-
mental health, and disease-advocacy NGOs built campaigns targeted against 
retailers and brand name products. These campaigns provided information to 
consumers about BPA risks and urged them to boycott products known to 
feature BPA. For example, the Breast Cancer Fund advised against buying 
plastic-coated toys and cooking utensils altogether, with ‘BPA-free’ plastics 
permissible if necessary. Some consumers began using stainless steel bottles 
and glass bottles as alternatives to plastic bottles. The SIGG scandal in 2009 
further intensified the debate over whether BPA should even be allowed to 
be present in bottles (Baker 2009). SIGG, a stainless steel bottle manufactur-
er, had claimed that its products were BPA-free, only for independent labora-
tory testing to discover that the bottle lining contained trace amounts of 
BPA. A widespread consumer backlash against SIGG was the result. 
 In 2008, the Canadian government imposed a ban on certain uses of BPA 
in consumer products. Even before the law came into effect, many consumer 
product manufacturers and retailers removed BPA products from their offer-
ings in Canada. Because of a common industry chain supplying both coun-
tries, Wal-Mart Canada, CVS, Toys’R’Us, Playtex, Nalgene, Whole Foods, 
and other companies in the US and Canada voluntarily stopped selling baby 
bottles and water bottles made with BPA. Nalgene Outdoors Products, based 
in Rochester, exemplifies this response to market pressures and regulatory 
risks. Steven Silverman, the firm’s manager, said: “Based on all available scien-
tific evidence, we continue to believe that Nalgene products containing BPA 
are safe for their intended use. However, our customers indicated they pre-
ferred BPA-free alternatives, and we acted in response to those concerns” 
(Austen 2008, p. C1). To stay in the bottle business, Nalgene introduced a 
line of bottles made from Eastman Chemical Company’s Tritan copolyester. 
 As this action suggests, product manufacturers began investigating BPA 
substitutes in response to retailers pulling BPA products from their shelves. 
A number of companies have turned to existing functional equivalents of 
BPA to develop their own BPA substitutes. Bisphenol S (BPS) is a popular 
BPA substitute, which boasts similar product attributes as BPA but with less 
risk of leaching from with heat or sunlight.3 BPS was first made in 1869 as a 
dye, but did not find commercial application until 2006 as a substitute for 
BPA in paper products such as cash-register receipts, airplane luggage tags, 
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and boarding passes. BPS can now be found in products made from recycled 
paper, like pizza boxes and food buckets.  
 BPA-substitutes also come from outside of the bisphenol family. In 2002, 
the Eastman Chemical Company began working on a new heat-resistant 
plastic called Tritan, which it released in 2007. Many product manufacturers 
quickly began using Tritan instead of BPA-containing polycarbonate to make 
infant products, water bottles, and food containers. To buttress its claims to 
safety, Eastman released third-party test results showing that Tritan mono-
mers do not bind to oestrogen or androgen receptors, and is therefore free of 
estrogenic activity (Eastman Chemical 2010).  
 Yet some recent scientific research indicates that Tritan, BPS, and other 
BPA substitutes do induce estrogenic activity and therefore pose endocrine 
disruption risks similar to BPA. In 2011, researchers at CertiChem, a chemi-
cal screening firm, reported that 92% of 102 commercially available plastic 
products (e.g. ‘BPA-free’ plastic cups marketed for children and purchased 
from Target, Walmart, and Babies R Us) leached chemicals with estrogenic 
activity (Yang et al. 2011). Scientists at the University of Texas Medical 
Branch in Galveston found that BPS, like BPA, disrupts the endocrine sys-
tem at extremely low doses, noting the similar size and structure of both 
chemicals, which both have the potential to bind to natural oestrogen recep-
tors inside cells (Viñas et al. 2013). These studies are troublesome in light of 
biomonitoring studies that show that even though BPS has only been in use 
for less than a decade, it is already pervasive in human populations: 81% of 
315 urine samples from men and women in the United States and seven Asian 
countries contained BPS (Liao et al. 2012).  
 In 2014, EPA’s ‘Design for the Environment’ program, which seeks to 
identify safer alternative chemicals, released a report assessing 19 chemical 
alternatives to BPA used in receipt paper, including BPS (US EPA 2014). The 
report found that BPS poses similar risks to public health as BPA, concluding 
that all of the BPA alternatives are associated with some trade-offs. Because 
the major US chemicals policy, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 
has allowed new chemicals to enter the market without being tested for safe-
ty, BPA substitutes have been offered to consumers with no or little public 
research available on the real or potential risks of such substances.  
6. Analyzing the Ethical Situations of Moral Actors 
Regarding BPA 
As BPA has emerged as a chemical of concern over the past 15 years, many 
actors in the chemical industry, government, and civil society in the US have 
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wrestled with the difficult dilemmas that using possibly harmful chemicals in 
products can pose. In deciding what to do, these actors have most often tak-
en three major ethical stances. 
 First, actors can employ deontological reasoning. Deontological theories 
determine moral action according to intention, or whether an action is done 
for the right reasons. The word ‘deontology’ derives from the Greek words 
for duty (deon) and science (logos). Deontologists assert that people have a 
duty to do the right thing no matter the consequences. Yet, deontologists 
differ in how they define what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘right’ action. For exam-
ple, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) asserted that be-
cause what is virtuous is not always identifiable, we must instead do ‘right’ 
(Hinton 2002). For Kant, to determine what ‘right action’ is, one must con-
sider whether the action would be desirable as a ‘universal law’. For example, 
the precautionary principle is sometimes invoked as a deontological base for 
environmental laws (Kysar 2010). According to deontologists, societies 
should prioritize human and environmental welfare ahead of economic profit 
as a universal norm of justice. Protecting human well-being is a fundamental 
societal value. If there is a possibility of serious, irreparable injury to human 
health occurring, even if scientific proof remains uncertain, then societies 
should intervene to prevent that harm.  
 Second, actors can rely on consequentialist ethics to guide their choices. 
This ethics holds that the consequences of an action will determine whether 
it is morally permissible or not. Moral action, then, is that which produces 
‘right consequences’. Utilitarianism, the most influential form of consequen-
tialism, applies the principle of utility to determine ‘right consequences’. The 
morally right action is the one that produces the most utility (‘the greatest 
good for the greatest number’). A strict utilitarian gives equal weight to each 
person’s well-being in assessing utility, ignoring whether an action has a neg-
ative impact on specific subgroups of society. However, John Stuart Mill 
(1806-1873) proposed balancing utilitarianism with a set of fundamental 
rights that defend individual liberties, namely the right to protection from 
harm, free speech, free association, and self-determination (Mill 1859). Mill’s 
merger of utilitarian moral theory with liberal political philosophy suggests 
that a moral society is comprised of individuals who are free to pursue their 
personal goals and interests, unless such pursuits harm another person.  
 Over the last century, utilitarian calculus has come to dominate decision-
making in government and business organizations. The practice of cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) operationalizes Mill’s liberal utilitarianism by measur-
ing all of the costs and benefits of a policy in economic terms, applying 
weights to different costs and benefits, and comparing the totals, with the 
overall objective being to maximize the ratio of total costs to total benefits. 
This utilitarian calculus requires that the calculator adopt an impartial ‘view 
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from nowhere’ in assessing all the costs and benefits for a range of possible 
actions. Thus a chemical industry consultant suggests: “The really prudent 
step is to make the best scientific evaluations of the risk from the product as 
compared to the risks and loss of benefits associated with removing it from 
the market before any actions are taken” (Entine 2011, pp. 19-20).  
 Finally, actors can choose to ostensibly sidestep ethical questions and in-
stead engage in technical arguments over how to interpret the scientific evi-
dence. Companies, regulators, and legislators frequently portray science as an 
arbiter of objective, factual truth. By doing so, they remove social and politi-
cal values from debates over chemical risks, and emphasize issues of method-
ological rigor, data quality, and expert credibility as the fundamental ones 
(Kinchy 2012). If other actors attempt to raise concerns about the underlying 
priorities of chemical manufacturing, or about the observation that chemical 
exposures are widespread, they are attacked as lacking in scientific rigor and 
biased. Actors who take a ‘scientized’ perspective fail to recognize that they, 
too, are often cloaking social and political values under a veneer of objectivity 
(ibid.). 
 We will now consider several key actor groups and summarize their po-
tential reasoning. Our approach is to consider the practices and statements of 
these actors as they respond to the BPA situation. 
6.1 Business managers and corporations  
Business executives must ponder whether their company should eliminate 
BPA or continue using it. At this time, they have access to incomplete, un-
certain information about BPA risks, so they must necessarily be speculative. 
Because of their organizational culture, managers are likely to use utilitarian 
reasoning to evaluate the costs and benefits to their company in taking a 
particular course of action. This analysis can vary between managers as well as 
different types of companies.  
 A firm manufacturing BPA stands to lose billions of dollars worth of sales 
over a few decades, since the substance has one of the highest production 
volumes worldwide. The firm could switch to producing substitutes for BPA 
to replace this lost market. But finding suitable alternatives and re-
engineering product design will require millions of dollars in R&D. Moreo-
ver, once alternative ingredients are found, new testing must be done to en-
sure those substances are safe, and new supply chain partners must be 
cultivated and vetted. Whereas BPA is already grandfathered under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, new chemicals may face more searching scrutiny 
from EPA. The company could undertake all of these activities only to lose 
its market-share to competitors who are not taking similar action. To oppose 
any change, managers could point to the existence of weak scientific evidence 
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that shows low-level exposure to their product causes future adverse health 
effects. From their perspective, hypothetical harm is not enough to warrant 
real financial risk. Exiting the BPA market could violate a company’s fiduci-
ary duty to its shareholders, to whom they are obligated to make sound fi-
nancial decisions. From this view, it would be morally permissible for a 
company to wait for clearer scientific evidence, new regulations, or sizeable 
consumer demand for safer alternatives.  
 In contrast, a retailer or a consumer product manufacturer might face a 
more complicated calculus. On one hand, ‘downstream’ firms can decide to 
trust that the chemical industry has public health interests at heart. There is 
no need to worry about possible BPA risks, since the chemical has already 
been on the market for decades, and any latent health consequences would 
have appeared by now if they were going to. Moreover, BPA has been ap-
proved by US government regulators for use in products. Many firms appear 
to require stronger government positions on BPA before they are willing to 
intervene. Such a stance effectively sidesteps the company’s ethical responsi-
bility, if any, by assigning it to scientists and governments. For example, the 
Coca Cola Company’s position on BPA maintains the status quo in the ab-
sence of regulatory action:  
While we are very aware of the highly publicized concerns and viewpoints that 
have been expressed about BPA, our point of view is that the scientific con-
sensus on this issue is most accurately reflected in the opinions expressed by 
those regulatory agencies whose missions and responsibilities are to protect 
the public’s health. The consensus repeatedly stated among regulatory agen-
cies in Australia, Canada, Europe, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and the 
United States is that current levels of exposure to BPA through food and bev-
erage packaging do not pose a health risk to the general population. [Coca-
Cola 2012, p. 38] 
The downstream company could also decide to apply utilitarian reasoning in 
the same way that a BPA manufacturer might. There would be costs from 
changing a product to be BPA-free, such as sourcing new raw materials, re-
formulating designs, and adjusting manufacturing equipment to use BPA 
substitutes. Manufacturers might encounter retailers which are reluctant to 
change their product lines. In evaluating the merits of eliminating BPA, firms 
could skeptically ask: how many human lives will be affected by health prob-
lems? Are adults dying from cancer, or are children suffering from develop-
ment problems such as undescended testes? Or are children afflicted by 
‘only’ small cognitive impairments like memory fragility? Companies may 
argue that too few people will be seriously injured to warrant the considera-
ble costs of transition to safer alternatives. They may treat their ethical co-
nundrum as a business decision. 
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 Yet downstream firms might benefit from maintaining or even expanding 
their markets as consumers demand safer products. They could acquire a 
reputation for protecting consumer well-being that translates into higher 
share prices, better employee morale, and government goodwill in setting 
standards. The firms may avoid legal and regulatory liability for continuing to 
use BPA. Even if courts are not yet ruling in lawsuits that BPA products 
harm consumers, there is arguably enough scientific evidence of BPA risks 
now to find that companies should have known about these risks and were 
negligent in failing to act to prevent them.  
 Nonetheless, business managers and companies do not have to adopt 
utilitarian reasoning. They may use deontological reasoning to declare that 
the risks of BPA call for precautionary action as soon as a threshold of suffi-
cient scientific evidence of potential harm is passed. That is, they do not have 
to await a decisive ruling or regulatory order before acting voluntarily to 
invest in innovation or to phase out BPA. Still, there can be wide differences 
of opinion as to what the appropriate threshold of scientific evidence should 
be. It could vary from ‘probable risk’ to ‘reasonably likely risk’ and to ‘plau-
sible but not likely risk’.  
6.2 Chemists and designers 
Most chemists and designers who work with BPA and other endocrine dis-
rupting chemicals in consumer products do so within an industry or corpo-
rate context. Therefore they are subject to similar pressures and 
considerations that managers have to face. They may adopt utilitarian reason-
ing along the same lines as discussed just above. They may decide that they 
ought to help maintain their employer’s business, ahead of any ethical issue. 
Indeed, they may think that they could lose their jobs if their employer does 
not thrive, or frowns on their ‘whistleblowing’ as regards chemical risks. 
They can put their personal welfare ahead of public welfare. 
 Nonetheless, chemists might believe that they have a duty to protect 
vulnerable populations such as children and pregnant women when designing 
molecules. Like business managers, they may have their own families and 
children to worry about, and they do have the moral agency to make funda-
mental design choices. Here, chemists can decide whether they have a deon-
tological obligation to implement green chemistry principles, which include 
designing out toxicity from chemicals where practicable, designing safer 
products, maximizing atom efficiency, using renewable feedstock, designing 
chemicals to degrade readily (Anastas & Warner 1998). However, the vast 
majority of chemists are not trained in environmental health, green chemis-
try, or even toxicology, so they can struggle to carry out green chemistry 
principles. They may not even know that the green chemistry field exists. 
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Thus their moral agency is inhibited by their professional and organizational 
conditions. 
 In practice, a number of product designers likely have raised significant 
concerns about BPA from within chemical and product manufacturers. They 
can point to emerging scientific evidence of estrogenic activity as a reason to 
intervene. However their ability to do so may rests on the availability of 
chemical substitutes that are reliably safer. In this regard, product managers 
can support the development of improved information tools like the EPA’s 
Safer Chemical’s list and independent or non-profit organizations that offer 
testing services to identify which materials leach chemicals with estrogenic 
activity.  
6.3 Regulators and legislators 
In the US, chemicals regulation is based on a utilitarian framework that re-
quires government officials, companies, and other actors to focus on the 
question of whether material convenience outweighs physical harm. The 
Toxic Substances Control Act has hamstrung officials at EPA when it comes 
to trying to regulate harmful chemicals. On one hand, regulators were 
obliged to prove that a chemical posed substantial risk to human health, the 
benefits of a regulatory action outweighed the burden to industry and socie-
ty, and the action was the most reasonable possible. In practice, regulators 
had to compile massive amounts of evidence, using cost benefit analysis and 
risk assessments, to justify any ban. This situation resulted, in part, from an 
US Court of Appeal ruling in 1989 that EPA did not provide enough evi-
dence to warrant an asbestos ban. On the other hand, regulators lacked pow-
er to require companies to carry out even basic toxicity screening of 
chemicals, so they were usually unable to prove that a risk existed. Thus oth-
erwise sympathetic officials were unable to escape their regulatory confines. 
By contrast, since the 1990s, EPA officials have become more willing to en-
force the new substances review program, in which new chemicals are evalu-
ated more closely for their health effects. But the number of existing 
chemicals far exceeds new chemicals: some 62,000 were already permitted 
under TSCA in 1976. 
 In recent years, EPA’s leadership has ordered the agency to tackle chemi-
cals more aggressively, a call grounded in the precautionary principle. For 
example, in a 2009 speech at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, the 
head of the EPA, Lisa Jackson, declared: “We need to review all chemicals 
against safety standards that are based solely on considerations of risk – not 
economics or other factors – and we must set these standards at levels that 
are protective of human health and the environment” (Jackson 2009). Even 
so, existing chemicals – of which BPA is one – readily evade review. In re-
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sponse, regulators could decide to create voluntary programs to coax indus-
try into doing more toxicity testing of chemicals and possibly phasing out 
especially harmful ones. Whether or not regulators actually engage in this 
work is an ethical choice. EPA officials may rely on utilitarian reasoning: is 
trying to build a BPA program likely to be politically or economically costly, 
compared to the health benefits? Will there be strong push-back from power-
ful companies? Or, the officials could invoke deontological reasoning and 
prioritize the voices of those people who are most affected by exposure to 
BPA, like children and mothers. 
 In turn, legislators are elected in a political environment in which dona-
tions and lobbying from industry interests have been rampant since the 
1980s. This is particularly true at the federal government level where the 
chemical industry has pervasive influence. Members of Congress thus face 
ethical quandaries: should they reject donations from the chemical industry 
and jeopardize their chances of re-election? Or should they heed calls from 
parents who are becoming more worried about chemical risks? Should more 
ecologically conscious Senators compromise their values and reach an agree-
ment with industry-friendly Senators in order to reform the Toxic Substanc-
es Control Act? Or should they hold out for more stringent rules that are 
less likely to become law? 
 In many cases, legislators (and regulators) simply decide to follow the 
status quo. They are unwilling to abandon their dependence on campaign 
finance. They can follow the lead of many companies in ignoring ethical 
questions altogether and emphasizing the need for more science. This behav-
ior is seen in the 2008 Congressional hearing on BPA, in which most indus-
try and government witnesses avoided debating the ethical issues at stake. 
Instead, they sparred over whether or not scientific evidence existed to justi-
fy regulatory action. As Marian Stanley of the American Chemistry Council 
testified during the 2008 Congressional hearing: “In the past 2 years compre-
hensive scientific assessments from the European Union, the U.S. National 
Toxicology Program, Health Canada, NSF International, and the European 
Food Safety Authority have all been undertaken, and these assessments sup-
port the continued safe use of consumer products containing BPA” (US 
Congress 2010, p. 81). 
 In other words, few participants at the hearing (apart from Dr. Ted Schet-
tler, a NGO scientist) brought up ethical questions such as: why are humans 
being exposed to harmful chemicals at all? Who is responsible for putting us 
into this predicament? Why not make safe products to begin with? What are 
the views of those people who are harmed the most? They remained trapped 
within a risk assessment paradigm that favors seemingly objective and neutral 
analysis. 
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 Yet, legislators can decide to take moral leadership by introducing new 
laws that force industry to remove BPA and other substances from products. 
In the US, this has tended to happen more often at the local and state gov-
ernment levels, which can be less subject to industry influences. As of 2015, 
at least 12 states from California to Massachusetts had passed some sort of 
restriction on BPA use (National Conference of State Legislatures 2015). 
Most of these laws banned the manufacture and sale of drinking bottles that 
contain BPA, if they were intended for use by young children. One law, in 
Minnesota, banned all uses of BPA in food containers for use by children. 
Moral leadership can also happen at the federal government level. In 2015, 
lawmakers introduced the BPA in Food Packaging Right to Know Act, 
which would make it illegal to sell food in containers with BPA unless the 
container is labeled with the statement: “This food packaging contains BPA, 
an endocrine-disrupting chemical, according to the National Institutes of 
Health.”4 This law, however, simply creates information aimed at consumers, 
who are obliged to decide whether they are willing to accept the risk of buy-
ing a potentially harmful product. It arguably shifts moral agency from firms 
to consumers. 
7. Conclusions 
By studying the BPA case, chemistry students can learn several critical les-
sons for use in their future careers. The full health and ecological impacts of 
chemicals may only appear long after widespread use in products begins. BPA 
use in products has become ubiquitous and many millions of people are ex-
posed to BPA. Although BPA’s estrogenic properties have been known since 
the early 1900s, whether its estrogenicity is harmful remains hotly debated. 
Faced with scientific controversy, government and company decision-makers 
may struggle to recognize and act on the emerging risks. Failure to address 
the potential risks of BPA has implications for the numerous chemicals used 
in consumer products that are suspected of being endocrine disruptors.  
 Companies are not inherently unethical in having helped disperse harmful 
chemicals into society if they could not foresee the health consequences. 
However faced with new knowledge about product risk, companies may act 
unethically if they persist in making or using these chemicals after evidence 
emerges signaling cause for concern (European Environmental Agency 
2001). With BPA, sufficient warning signals arguably exist now to justify the 
trade-off between ethical action and financial costs.  
 As we have seen, difficult ethical dilemmas exist when deciding whether 
sufficient scientific evidence exists to warrant actions such as reformulating 
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products, removing chemicals, or regulating substances. Should precaution-
ary action be taken, even though this might jeopardize a firm’s markets and 
profits? Or should the status quo be retained even though it might cause harm 
to some people? Deontological and consequential ethics theories are often 
applied to resolve these debates. The diverse values that people hold can color 
their thinking; calculations can vary widely. For example, Nalgene used utili-
tarian analysis to decide to remove BPA from its bottles, reasoning that the 
benefits of doing so would outweigh the costs. Yet, other firms did not with-
draw BPA, arguing that the economic costs of changing to an alternative 
substance would be too large. And the American Chemistry Council, joined 
by many companies, argued that more science was required to prove that a 
BPA risk existed, or that regulators had certified BPA as safe, implying that 
ethical questions were irrelevant. 
 Numerous actors involved in chemicals production and use have moral 
agency because of their ability to influence chemical product design. They 
can be held ethically accountable for their actions and the consequences of 
those actions. They can be inside firms, in government departments, and 
scattered across civil society. Chemists are not the only actors who can make 
ethical choices that matter, and they can find allies in many places inside and 
outside industry. These allies can be sympathetic managers, other firms, regu-
lators, and environmental NGOs who want to make chemicals safer. Civil 
society involvement can also increase scrutiny of the choices of corporations 
and chemists regarding toxic chemicals. The work of activists such as the 
Breast Cancer Fund and Clean Production Action can help improve decision-
making through critically appraising why companies are using BPA in prod-
ucts.  
 The BPA case is only one example of a growing number of chemical risks 
calling for an industry response. Other substances of concern include 
phthalates, flame retardants like polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs), 
and perfluorinated compounds such as perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and 
perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS). These chemicals raise similar concerns 
through their ability to damage human development and reproduction; they 
can also cause certain kinds of cancers. Phthalates are commonly found in 
soft toys and cosmetics; flame retardants are everywhere from electronics to 
furniture; PFOA is used in teflon-coated pots and Goretex clothes. As we 
saw, in trying to substitute apparently safer chemicals for known or suspect-
ed toxins, firms can choose substances that are little better due to lax regula-
tory screening.  
 As this case makes clear, the way forward is difficult. Removing toxic 
chemicals from consumer goods is a vast political, economic, and design chal-
lenge that poses many complex ethical dilemmas for the diverse stakeholders 
involved. Better understanding of the ethical dimensions of creating safer 
100 Abigail Martin, Alastair Iles & Christine Rosen 
 
consumer goods can help lay the foundation for opening up better communi-
cation between regulators and legislators, company managers, chemists and 
product designers, consumers, and the public. By helping all actors develop 
deeper analysis of the ethical values at stake and the underlying moral com-
mitments that they share with one another, they can create a safer, more 
sustainable chemical industry, even with imperfect science. You can play an 
important part in this process through whatever you end up doing. 
Notes
 
1 In 1958, for example, Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics 
Act, which included the now-repealed ‘Delaney Clause’. This provision effectively 
required FDA to prohibit food additives and pesticide residues that were “found 
to induce cancer when ingested by man or laboratory animals”. The Delaney 
Clause was repealed in 1996, but not before 40 years of toxiciological testing en-
trenched carcinogens as a fundamental concern.  
2 For example, if the control group has an average of one tumor per animal and the 
test group has an average of four tumors per animal, the chemical is said to in-
crease human cancer incidence by 300 percent.  
3 A BPA molecule consists of two phenol groups connected by a branched three-
carbon group, whereas a BPS molecule has two phenol groups connected by a sul-
phone group (-SO2). 
4 The bill has been introduced to committee but no hearings have been conducted. 
See: https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/821. 
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